On the Origin of Morality

Jerusha Joel

What do you feel when you hear of a young girl being brutally raped and murdered? What came to your mind when you heard of the Israeli police storming a Palestian mosque housing innocent worshippers? And what passions or sentiments overcome you when you hear of or witness injustice, discrimmination and oppression of kinds? Our emotions and thoughts under such circumstances, can be summed up in one word- moral outrage. We are disturbed, disgusted and angered by such conduct. But why are we outraged? Is it not because a standard of goodness has been violated? i.e, something 'wrong' has been done that fell short of this standard. This standard of goodness that we prescribe to inorder to determine right from wrong can be called morality. If so, where does morality come from, i.e why does one action define itself in our minds as being 'good' and another action as 'bad'? Why are they not simply 'actions' which are independent of any immaterial connotations? Why do all actions have inherent meaning attached to them? In a nutshell, how can we explain the existence of morality?

This is the question that I will be discussing in this essay as I attempt to provide here what is in my opinion, the best explanation for the existence of morality.

Richard Dawkins, a prominent torchbearer of atheistic philosophy rejects "the preposterous idea that we need God to be good." However, what he seems to have completely overlooked in making such a statement is that almost every theist would agree with him. And so do I. The point of this essay is not to prove the moral superiority of those who believe in God. Such an argument would be easily falsifiable since evidence clearly demands otherwise. Many atheists do live upright lives and have high conceptions or standards of morality. To deny that would certainly be as preposterous as the idea that the theist is unable to think or reason critically and has accepted his faith through blind belief. For both statements do not have sufficient proof to validate them and can rest only upon an unfounded and ignorant generalization that claims the experience of the few to encompass the rest.

But what we will be examining is the question of the origin of morality as elaborated in the first paragraph.

Let us first consider the evolutionary explanation for the origin of morality. This theory ascribes the existence of morality to the process of evolution and uses the principle of natural selection to demonstrate how altruistic behaviour was beneficial for the survival and promulgation of the human species and society by enhancing social cohesion and cooperation. Thus, it establishes morality to be an inherited genetic trait, a biological predisposition that evolved in the course of the customary struggle for survival. 

It is undeniable that moral behaviour is advantageous for human society and assuming that all life on earth is a product of this unguided process called evolution, altruistic tendencies do have a serviceable role to play in ensuring the survival of the human species. However, this explanation for the existence of morality proves inadequate in many ways.

Interestingly, Richard Dawkins uses the illustration of altruistic behaviour observed among chimpanzee troops (For example, scratching each other's back, nurturing one's family, working in teams etc.) to show that morality is nothing more than a genetic inheritance or adaptation for survival. 

First of all, explaining that the 'biological predisposition' for moral behaviour evolved during the struggle for survival doesn't establish that such behaviour is rational. This is what Charles Darwin realized when he said, "But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?" The naturalistic evolutionary process is geared towards fitness and survival, but it lacks any coherent, meaningful foundation for ascertaining truth or rationality. Philosopher and apologist, C.S Lewis said, "But if their thoughts (of those who believe in atheistic evolution) are merely accidental by-products (of an accidental process caused by an accidental collision), why should we believe them to be true? I see no reason for believing that one accident should be able to give me a correct account of all the other accidents. It's like expecting that the accidental shape taken by the splash when you upset a milk jug should give you a correct account of how the jug was made and why it was upset." Thus explaining moral behaviour with naturalistic evolution not only undermines the belief that it is 'correct' and 'rational' but also our trust in the reasoning process that we use to arrive at moral judgements. Can we rely on an untrustworthy thought process (which was an accident of evolution) to reach a trustworthy conclusion? After all, "How can we trust the convictions of a monkey's mind?"

To proceed, what the theory of naturalistic evolutionary ethics claims is that the moral awareness of human beings has only biological worth i.e, it is nothing more than a biological and psychological impulse that aids the survival of human society. In response to such a bold assertion, we should ask ourselves as beings who understand and practice morality whether it really does function like some of our other biological traits. Consider the sexual urge or drive which is biologically inherent in human beings. Scientists and psychologists claim that sexual desire "is, in fact a bodily urge, analogous to hunger or the blood's need for oxygen"  According to clinical psychologist Dr. Rob Dobrenski, “in many ways we can’t control what we desire because it is a hard-wired emotional and physiological response.” Supposing that morality or the predisposition towards altruistic behaviour is indeed a biological trait inherent in humans as is the sex drive, it seems vital to first ask whether morality dones the appearance of such "a hard-wired emotional and physiological response" as do all of our inherited biological dispositions. Do we engage in moral behaviour because we feel an irresistible urge and desire to do so? Or do we do so because we know or conclude through reasoning that it is the 'right' thing to do? To further build up upon this argument, a biological urge demands a compulsion towards certain behaviour. How often do we feel compelled to be moral? In contrast we usually feel compelled to engage in that behaviour which will satisfy some of our baser desires. For example, we might feel an urge to copy during an exam that we haven't studied for, although we know quite well that it is unethical to do so. Or suppose we are asked if we committed an act which mandates a punishment, the instinctual urge in such a circumstance would be to deny that we did so and save 'ourselves' (again, survival and self-preservation) from the penalty.

When have we ever had to fight an urge to do right in order to engage in wrongdoing? It is always quite the opposite. As human beings we often find it much easier to do what is 'wrong' rather than what is 'right'. We consciously decide to take the 'right' course of action, usually against our impulses. All we have to do to inorder to debunk the idea that morality is a biological impulse inherent in humans, is take a look at the world or society that we live in. It is saturated with crime, evil, wickedness and the great suffering produced in consequence. One could say that such immoral behaviour is practiced only by a deviant minority, but even that is not backed by evidence. Suppose I have a very bad temper which is easily flustered and causes a lot of pain to the people I live with. I would not want to lose my cool and hurt my family, I would know it is wrong to do so but I am often unable to control my innate predisposition towards getting angry easily. T.H Huxley who coined the term 'agnosticism' and was a vocal supporter of Darwin's theory of evolution, said the very same thing when he argued that human beings are imperfect in many of their biological properties and what is 'morally right' often contradicts humans' animal nature! Thus, evolutionary theory fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for why human beings practice moral behaviour or how the moral distinctions of 'good' and 'bad' came to exist in the first place.

Hence, we understand that the concept of morality cannot in any case be separated from its normative implications i.e, a standard or ideal presupposes all morally meaningful behaviour. 

By attributing the process of evolution to the existence of morality, these theorists have succeeded only in rationalizing the behaviour which we consider as morally 'good' or 'bad'. It might provide a reason for why we engage in good behaviour but it doesn't explain why we consider that behaviour to be 'good' in the first place. Scottish philosopher, David Hume has pointed out the fallaciousness of "attempting to infer non-natural properties (being morally good or right) from natural ones (the facts and processes of evolution)". He called this the naturalistic fallacy. For instance, some scientific studies have discovered that rape is "biologically advantageous" for animals since it would serve the purpose of survival by helping to pass on genetic material even in the absence of a willing mate. It is important to note here that these studies have not concluded or stated that rape is therefore a 'good' thing. They were only affirming a fact of nature- that rape can aid the survival of species. The point is that being advantageous for survival didn't make this behaviour morally correct. Thus, "one cannot reason from a statement of fact to a statement of moral obligation." Therefore, even if one establishes that morality owes its origin to the process of evolution, it doesn't prove that moral behaviour is rational or correct. Just because we know that something 'is so', it provides no grounds for claiming that 'it ought to be so.' It would seem rather that the 'moral' meaning of actions and behaviours precedes its rationality and is distinct from it. This mental category of 'ought' that we are all deeply conscious of, indubitably proves the inadequacy of the evolutionary argument. Thus, we arrive at the normative element of morality. To quote from the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy,

"Since our concern is with morality, the crucial issue to begin with is the origins of moral judgment: for morality has not merely to do with certain emotions and behaviors (such as sympathy and altruism) as such, but with the exercise of moral judgment about how one ought to behave in various social circumstances" (This does not include social 'etiquette' which is often confused with morality, but is social in the sense that moral actions and behaviour always necessitate a relationship)

I do not think many of us will, upon careful reflection, conclude that the morality we possess is nothing more than a biological disposition of the brain. Such a proposition would be clearly disproved by the moral 'judgements' that we often make about what one 'ought to do' in particular situations which are often a product of much meditative reflection and careful thought. We engage in moral behaviour, not always because we feel an inexplicable, biological urge to do so but only after we arrive at a conclusion of what would be 'the right thing to do' after much evaluation and deliberation of the situation. To illustrate this point, consider a situation in which a teenager is found beating up a younger boy. At first glance, it seems to be a simple case of bullying for which the older boy deserves a strict punishment and stern warning. But then further details start to emerge. We learn that the boy comes from a broken home where he receives no nurture, and he is a frequent target of beatings from his drunk father. That would significantly alter the semantics of the incident. We would then refrain from dealing out the usual reprimand and instead carefully deliberate upon how best to tackle the abused child and his resulting deviant behaviour. Now, compassion and patience would dominate our approach, accompanied with a firm reminder of acceptable behaviour and an attempt to alleviate the distress at home. Therefore, morality is more complex than a simple biological urge. It involves complicated reasoning and purposeful reflection.

This also seems to imply that there are knowable moral 'truths' which must be discovered. That would be incompatible with the idea of the unreflective and inherent psychological disposition towards moral behaviour conferred by the meaningless, valueless and unguided process of evolution. It seems irrational to presume that matter and chance can confer obligation and responsibility, concepts with value and meaning attached to them, upon organisms which were a chance product of a fortuitous and purposeless process. We will examine this argument in greater detail in a later paragraph, but let us proceed for now into an ensuing contention that follows from the surmise that there are moral truths that exist independently. 

Evolutionists often cite the evolving moral standards of humanity throughout history to justify their claim that morality is simply a product of evolution. They rightly point out that many practices which were considered to be morally justifiable in the past are designated to be acts of grave wrongdoing in the present. For example, the slave trade which was widely practiced and accepted in America during the 17th and 18th centuries, was later considered to be a grave violation of human rights and thus a morally condemnable act. Or take for instance the historical oppression of women. It was considered morally proper for women to live a life of subjugation and submission to the dictates of patriarchy. It was only later in the 18th century that women were recognized (at least in theory) to be equal to men and given the same rights and privileges. In light of such indisputable documentation of transforming moral values, it might seem almost imperative to admit at once that morality does indeed evolve, it continues to do so and that the quality of 'absolute truth' cannot be attributed to it.

Therefore, someone could say, "Morality is relative, and not absolute." Although the point of this essay is to discuss the origin of morality, I will attempt to provide a basic refutation of the philosophy of moral relativism, since it is a direct derivative from the observation that moral principles sometimes do differ across groups and cultures, one which has some bearing upon the matter of morality's origin.

Moral relativism follows from the premise that there is no absolute truth, i.e all truth is relative or subjective. However, when we make a statement saying that 'there is no absolute truth', we are actually making an absolute truth claim. In fact, we are saying "it is absolutely true that there is no absolute truth." It would be equal to saying something like "God told me He doesn't exist." Such a proposition would be self-defeating i.e it produces a paradox or contradiction instead of making a good argument for its validity. Dr.Nabeel Quereshi, a philosopher and apologist exhibited the fallacy of this claim perfectly when he said "If truth doesn't exist, then it would be true that truth doesn't exist, and once again we arrive at truth. There is no alternative; truth must exist."

Moral relativism claims that morality is variable, subjective and personal. If so, at the very outset, a moral relativist must ask this question, "How do I know that morality is relative?" The obvious answer would be that the cultural and historical variability of moral values provides sufficient evidence to reach this conclusion. 

However, If one were to conclude that morality (what 'ought' to be done) is relative by observing historical and cultural conflict in moral principles, we are also naturally presuming that morality is nothing more than what a culture or historical period defines it to be i.e, what is morally 'right' is fluid, subjective and ever-changing. If I desire to be morally upright, all I have to do is obey everything that my culture or socio-historical circumstance tells me to do. But then of course, what Nazi Germany did to the Jews was morally justifiable since their moral conceptions taught them to believe in the superiority of the Aryan race. Sati and child marriage were not wrong at all since their propounders genuinely believed that they were doing something 'righteous'. And it was perfectly understandable for the British to execute starving, young children for stealing apples since dishonesty was an unforgivable 'crime' in their moral code. A moral relativist cannot condemn the actions and behaviour of any culture, historical period or person since he believes in no transcendent moral standard that supersedes differing conceptions and interpretations of morality. Only from the assumption that absolute, objective and unchangeable moral truths exist, can we denounce questionable values and refuse to conform to them, in adherence to a higher ideal.

And this is indeed what happens for conceptions of morality to change. Some moral ideals are identified and pursued often at great personal or even general cost. For example, Williaim Wilberforce devoted his entire life towards abolishing the slave trade in Britain, facing great opposition and hardship in order to do so. In another instance, there was a great civil war in America as a consequence of the tensions between the northern and southern states over the abolition of the slave trade and equality for the blacks. They stood up for what they 'knew' was right and the narrative of history agrees with them. Why do we talk about the 'right' side of history? We would not even think of saying that the slave traders were 'right' too in their own way!

Thus, such moral reforms do not make coherent sense unless there are objective moral values to explain and substantiate our perceptions or attitudes towards such transformations in society. Why do we even call them 'reforms'? The general idea is that society has been changed for 'the better' or that we have taken a step in the 'right' direction. This seems to indicate that the evolving values and principles of human society is an indication of a continually progressive pursuit of an objective, absolute and extrinsic moral ideal rather than an evolving biological predisposition which has no external value or grounds to explain it. 

Therefore, I would raise the question of whether it is morality itself that evolved and continues to evolve throughout history or simply our perceptions and conceptions of it? If we claim that something such as the slave trade which is morally wrong now, was perfectly right back then, why do we look back into the past and condemn the actions of our ancestors? It would be more rational to excuse their behaviour and state that morality in those days just wasn't what it is now. Instead we engage in unsparing judgement of past practices and hold them fully accountable for all they have done. In fact, what we are actually saying is that, slave trade was wrong back then, it is wrong now and will continue to be wrong no matter what humankind thinks about it! This seems to suggest rather, that morality (what one ought to do) is perpetually the same, that the slaves of long ago had inherent worth and value which was deserving of freedom and dignity and that the slave traders were wrong to deny them of this, even if they did not realize it. Even the fact that social reformers subscribed to values and principles that differed from those of their times (as is seen even today), attests to a 'transcultural' moral standard of humanity. In effect, such a conception of morality attests to an absolute standard of goodness that exists 'yesterday,today and forever'. 

One other major reason for the implausibility of the moral relativism stance is the obvious disparity and incongruity that is characteristic of the arguments and propositions of moral relativists. They profess to believe in the subjectivity of morality but yet are often the most vocal and enthusiastic condemners of behaviour that they perceive to be morally 'wrong'. If morality is truly subjective, they should be willing to accede the privilege of defining what is morally 'right', indiscriminately to everyone. Even in criticising moral absolutists who impose a universal moral code on everyone, they are negating their belief in moral relativity since they demand that others accept their moral beliefs. Therefore moral relativism is simply not viable.The only moral relativists who are consistent in what they say and do in claiming that moral values are subjective, are dictators, tyrants, despots and oppressors or common criminals- thieves, murderers and abusers. The very fact that we lock our doors at night demonstrates why we cannot live in a world where morality is relative!

Thus moral values are discovered and pursued. They are not invented by human beings, nor can they be explained away as a chance product of a chance mutation caused by a chance process. Don't we all agree that our ignorance about the existence of something doesn't nullify it's existence? I.e, just because we don't know that something exists, it doesn't mean that the 'something' doesn't exist. It's existence is independent of our awareness and knowledge of it. For instance, there are a great many scientific laws and facts that we know about today which we did not know about some years or even centuries (in some instances) ago. For example, scientists did not know for sure that there were other planets outside the solar system until 1992 when they discovered the first exoplanet. But those planets existed even before we knew about them. And there are numerous such examples. Think of the many fascinating details that we know about the natural world today which we did not know about some years back and the many new discoveries we are yet to make about it. So also moral 'truths' remain to be sought and discovered like those which were realized throughout history and in different cultures at varying rates like those of the inherent value of each human life, the equality and liberty of all humankind, knowledge of the highest compassion, mercy and generosity, sacrificial love and loyalty etc. The moral narrative of human history greatly resembles the scientific pursuit for knowledge. It's comprehension and understanding of a stable natural world evolves as do human perceptions of moral principles. Just like the laws and features of the natural world remain constant, so also morality is perpetually constant whatever humankind knows or doesn't know about it.

Importantly, although it might seem at first glance that our moral ideals and conceptions today are vastly superior and advanced to those of our preceding generations, a closer look would show us that it is not always so. If we probe deeper into the moral fabric of our present postmodern society and dissect its values and true motivations, we would find not only a disturbing erosion of some core moral principles such as personal integrity, tolerance etc. but also a shallow superficiality and deceptiveness corroding the true nature of morality. And this is commonly agreed upon among many people.

Besides, we must admit that there are common moral principles which are universal to all of humanity. This is called 'universal moral grammar'. For example, the murder of innocent people. Once the embellishments and supplements of culture are removed there exists underneath quite a similar moral code. For instance, different countries might have different views of capital punishment, but there also might lie an underlying agreement that murder is morally evil since human life is valuable. Just because there are hazy areas of contention between the two categories of good and evil, doesn't mean that there are no moral absolutes. As lexicographer Samuel Johnson put it, “The fact that there is such a thing as twilight does not mean that we cannot distinguish between day and night.”

To conclude the argument against moral relativism, here's what Mussolini famously said about this philosophy:

"Everything I have said and done these last years is relativism, by intuition. From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that everybody has the right to create for himself his own ideology, and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable. If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories, and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective immortal truth, then there is nothing more relativistic than fascism."

So far, I have endeavored to refute the most commonly cited arguments and theories that evolutionists use to explain the existence of morality. However, as the inference of each argument, we have also reached some positive conclusions: Morality presupposes an immaterial or normative 'truth' (the 'ought to' element) which cannot be rationalized by naturalistic evolution, there exists an absolute standard of morality which supersedes human perceptions and experiences and morality must be objective, unchangeable and universal. 

I will now proceed to make a positive case for what I believe to be the most plausible and sound explanation for the origin and existence of a moral law. Since we have deduced that there are indeed absolute, objective, unchangeable morals in the world (and it is impossible to deny this), we would then be faced with the task of rationalizing their existence. 

Like I said at the very beginning, judging an action or behavior to be morally 'wrong' indicates that some objective standard of goodness has been transgressed. But then where does this absolute, objective and unchangeable standard come from? Let us first attempt to ascertain what qualities or characteristics this standard would necessarily have to possess. Dr. Michael J. Kruger, theologian and apologist talks about three such features upon which I will elaborate and add my own assertions.

First of all, this standard as we have already proved and determined, would have to be absolute i.e fixed and unquestionable. It would have to be unsurpassed, unrivalled and supreme. Other than the reasons I have previously given to prove why relative morality is unsustainable, think of how unfeasible it would be to infer the moral quality of an action from an external standard which is only partly perfect i.e, a mix of good and evil. Predominantly, such a flawed yardstick would not be a dependable or sound guide to infer the moral worth of any behaviour. It might deceive or misguide us about what is morally 'correct' and then we would have to admit that we don't have any definitive means of measuring morality. But this is certainly contradictory to the confident moral judgements we unthinkingly make almost everyday of our lives. For example, if the standard of goodness (we refer to) was not perfect, we would have to say that we can't be sure whether sexism is 'really' wrong. Secondly, how do we explain how we are even able to recognize that this standard is imperfect unless there is a still higher standard to judge it by? If the first, hypothetical standard was really my standard to judge morality, I should never have been able to comprehend that it was imperfect in the first place. Like C.S Lewis said, "A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line." If I really do have a means of comparison to deem the first standard imperfect, then that 'means' should be my "ultimate moral guide." Thus we are forced to conclude that our existing standard or ideal of goodness must and is 'absolutely' perfect!

While we were examining the validity of the moral relativity claim and the moral conflict between cultures and historical periods, we determined that it could only be human perceptions and conceptions of morality that change, while the ideal standard of morality remains perpetually constant. It would follow from this that another quality of the absolute moral standard is that it is superior to human opinions about morality i.e, this standard is dissociated from and independent of what humankind thinks about right and wrong or good and evil. Surely this could be the only proposition that explains why we judge past atrocities to be evil even if that particular generation did not consider it to be so. Thus, an absolute moral standard transcends human experience and opinion. It cannot be something that is only human.

We deliberated earlier about how morality presupposes a norm i.e what 'ought' to be done. We also saw how naturalistic evolution fails to come even close to providing an explanation for why moral behaviour is rational and correct. It tells us why we engage in moral behaviour but not why we should presume that it is 'right' to do so, as even the atheist is persuaded. We understand by now that morality confers upon us an 'obligation' to do what is morally right. Now under this surmise, the evolutionist is left with an unsolvable challenge. How does a universe which owes its existence to the random collocation of atoms of matter plus time plus chance impose a meaningful moral code that mandates obligation, responsibility and accountability upon organisms who are themselves accidental products of an accidental process created by an accidental collision? I will provide an example which proves that morality has deep meaning which far exceeds a simple utilitarian purpose. In one of his public talks, Richard Dawkins after he gave his arguments to establish that morality is simply a biological adaptation suited for survival, proceeded to comment upon religious belief, telling his audience that if any of them practiced morality simply because they feared what their God would do to them if they didn't, that was a very poor and deplorable reason to be moral. Although I'm sure Mr.Dawkins felt that he had just made a very insightful exposé of the true nature of religious morality, the irony in what he said was mind-blowing. He had unknowingly contradicted his own propositions about naturalistic evolutionary ethics, since he was saying that one needed a 'moral' reason to be moral i.e, one should be moral because it was the 'right' thing to do and not for a selfish reason such as to avoid retribution. Richard Dawkins who believes in a universe of random matter, time and chance, who defends the theory that our morality is simply a survival mechanism resembling those of monkeys, had just conferred obligation and responsibility upon his fellow beings to not only be moral, but to be moral for the 'right' reasons! Now how was he to explain to whom or what we are thus obligated to fulfill such a high standard of morality? This is important because obligation and responsibility usually suggests a 'relationship'. It is hard to imagine being obligated to a random accident of time, matter and chance. For instance, I have an 'obligation' to obey my parents and respect them because of all the nurture they have given me. Now, humanity as a whole generally believes that it has an obligation to be moral, but to whom?

The moral responsibility of human beings proves most rational and meaningful with the existence of a God and creator- A perfect, transcendent and personal being (as debated in the last three paragraphs) who is the source of all morality, whose creation dimly emulates His attributes since they were made in His own image, and to whom they are obligated to obey the moral law that He has written on their hearts. And thus the only coherent foundation for moral absolutes is God himself.

Such a view of morality which conceives of it as being the foundation of humanity's relationship with their creator, would also explain why we perceive a responsibility to obey an objective moral code even when it comes into conflict with cultural or social expectations and rules. For our relationship with our creator would obviously transcend in importance and value, those which we enjoy with our fellow human beings.

Here, it is important to understand that the theistic worldview does not consider God to be simply one element or object within the natural world, but rather the infinite and transcendent cause of it. But then as the Standard encyclopedia of philosophy says, "If this is the right way to think about the debate, then it is not obvious that atheism is (more probable) than theism. For the debate is not about the existence of one object, but the character of the universe as a whole." Therefore, to believe that human beings are answerable to an objective moral code is to say that this enables us to draw a conclusion about the very character of the universe. Since the conflicting philosophies of atheism and theism are grounded upon debate over the character of the universe and as absolute naturalism is unable to provide a good explanation for such moral responsibility, the obvious moral nature of the universe posits an excellent reason to infer the existence of a perfectly moral creator (or cause) who is the very embodiment of goodness.

Sexual predator and cannibal Jeffrey Dahmer acknowledged the impossibility of inferring objective morality from an atheistic worldview when he said, "If it all happens naturalistically, what’s the need for a God?  Can’t I set my own rules? Who owns me? I own myself."

Therefore late German philosopher,  Emmanuel Kant wrote, "The assumption of a supreme intelligence, as the one and only cause of the universe, though in the idea alone, can therefore always benefit reason and can never injure it." Kant was thus admitting that presupposing the existence of a perfect, transcendent and personal God who was the creator and cause of the universe, allows one to rationalize such features and qualities found in it such as the existence of objective morality. He further reinforced the idea of theism having a constructive influence on reason, by saying, "There is a sense in which theoretical reason itself inclines towards affirmation of God, because it must assume that reality is rationally knowable: If one wishes to achieve systematic knowledge of the world, he ought to regard it as if it were created by a supreme reason." What he means is that confidence in the reasoning process requires us to believe in an intelligent creator who was the cause of that reason and of everything else. For if I do not believe that a supreme intelligence created my intelligence, then I have no reason to believe that my reasoning will lead me to a trustworthy conclusion. For 'thought' then becomes to me, nothing more than an accidental sensation created by a random arrangement of atoms and chemicals and thus even 'truth' ceases to exist. C.S Lewis echoed this when he wrote, "Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple. If the whole universe has no meaning, we should never have found out that it has no meaning."

Interestingly many atheists and agnostics themselves, have admitted the obvious plausibility of the existence of a good God explaining the origin of objective morality. Philosopher Sharon Street argues that an evolutionary story about how we came to make the moral judgments we make undermines confidence in the objective truth of those judgments. The late atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie said that "moral properties are “queer” given naturalism for if there are objective values, they make the existence of a god more probable than it would have been without them. He said, "if objective moral truths existed, they would warrant a supernatural explanation". While agnostic, Paul Draper observes, “A moral world is very probable on theism.”

I must add in conclusion, that the debate over morality and its origin is far more deep and vast than the specific arguments and ideas I have examined in this essay. Not only is this space insufficient to contain the full enormity and extent of its discourse, but I am also impeded in this exercise by a lack of sufficient knowledge to exhaustively survey and do full justice to this topic. However, I would hope that I have succeeded in demonstrating that there is a very strong case for inferring God's being from the existence of morality as the best possible explanation for it. In consequence, if that creator is indeed the infinite source of all goodness and the very essence or expression of all virtue, I think we might safely conclude that this God is worth seeking, finding and ultimately, knowing. I have therefore decided to wrap up all my refutations, reasoning and arguments with this fitting statement- "Let me commend this God to you"…